Senior US representative in Iran has doubts over nuclear deal – .

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Senior US representative in Iran has doubts over nuclear deal – .


The main US envoy for nuclear negotiations with Iran, Rob Malley, is increasingly doubting the possibility of a return to the 2015 JCPOA deal, the New York Times reported on Saturday.

“There is a real risk here that they will come back with unrealistic demands on what they can achieve in these talks,” he said in an interview with The Times, referring to President-elect Ebrahim Raisi taking power. later this week.

The experience and scientific knowledge acquired by Tehran by continuing to enrich uranium to 60% and continuing to use advanced centrifuges such as the IR-4 and IR-6.

According to the JCPOA, Iran was limited to enriching itself at 5% with at most a few dozen advanced centrifuges.

The 60% enrichment level is two jumps from the 5% level and is considered only one step below the 90% weapon level.

Exploitation of hundreds of IR-4s and IR-6s is seen as a major achievement that may allow Tehran to design a larger-scale program that could eventually enrich enough uranium for a nuclear bomb in a matter of weeks. .

Regarding Iran’s new achievements and whether the newly acquired knowledge could render the JCPOA obsolete, Malley told The Times: “At this point we will have to reassess the way forward; we hope it does not come to that.

A battle between Iran and the United States has been the terms of what comes after a return to the JCPOA.

Tehran wants to prevent Washington from being able to easily reverse sanctions against the regime by securing a guarantee that the Biden administration will not withdraw unilaterally and could even guarantee that it will remain in effect beyond the end of Biden’s first term in January. 2025.

However, Malley and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said there was no way to tie the hands of a future president in a democracy and that the best tactic to preserve a deal is to demonstrate that he works for all parties involved.

“There is no guarantee; it is not in the nature of diplomacy… But we have no intention – the president has no intention – to spend all these months negotiating a return to the deal and then withdrawing, ”said Malley. .

The Biden administration may begin to explore other avenues towards a direct return to the JCPOA, the Times reported.

In MID-MAY, the Jerusalem Post was the first to report on the new book Iran’s Perilous Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons by President of the Institute for Science and International Security David Albright and researcher Sarah Burkhard.

“The easiest way to dramatically reduce Iran’s prospects of building nuclear weapons is to focus on the pillars of nuclear explosives production and nuclear militarization,” Albright wrote.

Albright’s strategy would break with the JCPOA in light of developments since 2015, but it would provide another means of monitoring and preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.

Part of the reason why the focus should be on IAEA inspections on militarization, wrote Albright, is that, realistically, “the elimination of [nuclear] The mainstay of the delivery system is harder to thwart because Iran has so many options for delivering nuclear weapons, ranging from ballistic missiles to cruise missiles to ships.

“Negotiations should aim to limit ballistic missiles, but it must be recognized that eliminating this pillar in its entirety is impossible” given the years of Western appeasement and Iranian progress on the issue, he wrote.

Classically, the fight over US policy toward Iran divides into those who are for or against returning to the 2015 nuclear deal, including the lifting of Trump-era sanctions for Tehran’s return to nuclear limitations. of the agreement.

While Albright has pointed out flaws in the 2015 deal for years, he’s also realistic.

Given the posture of the Biden administration, Albright explores how the United States and other interested countries could try to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon even if some of its “nuclear pillars” fail. are not stuck as much as he might hope.

On the contrary, he suggests, one of the main benefits of the 2018 Mossad raid on Tehran’s secret nuclear archives is that it gives world powers much more information on how to oversee and block the militarization of the nuclear program by Iran.

OK SR, that would require a much more aggressive approach on the part of the IAEA and world powers to determine where every element of militarization revealed by the archives is stored and to monitor them all.

In some ways, that in itself would be a game-changing approach. But Albright suggests that might be acceptable given the new information and the idea that the items being watched have only justification for militarization.

He cites three things the IAEA would need to explore and monitor regarding Iran’s efforts.

One would be for Tehran to “maintain the ability to use computer codes to simulate a nuclear weapon explosion.” Greater use of simulations would make component testing less necessary.

A second would be to “maintain control of the multipoint initiation system, for example the shock wave generator, possibly including having performed a successful” cold test “of a nuclear explosive with a surrogate nuclear core. “

The third would be “to have the capacity to manufacture the neutron initiator”.

These three elements, if not monitored by the IAEA, could help Tehran move much faster to be able to detonate the uranium it enriches for a nuclear bomb.

On the other hand, if the IAEA obtains new inspection powers over those elements that have been exposed by the Mossad, Iran could be prevented from developing a nuclear weapon despite other major flaws in the 2015 nuclear deal.

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